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Abstract: The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and its supplemental labour 
pact, the North American Agreement on Labour Cooperation (NAALC), reflect the uneven 
advances of labour rights advocacy in connection with international trade. NAFTA provides 
extensive rights and protections for multinational firms and investors in such areas as intellectual 
property rights and investment guarantees. The NAALC only partially addresses labour rights 
and labour conditions. But within its limits, it has shown itself to be a viable tool for cross-
border solidarity among key actors in the trade union, human rights and allied movements. The 
NAALC’s principles and complaint mechanisms create new space for advocates to build 
coalitions and take concrete action to articulate challenges to the status quo and advance 
workers’ interests. Cooperation, consultation, and collaboration among social actors have 
brought a qualitative change to transnational labour rights networks in North America. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Rise of Workers’ Rights in Trade Policy Debates 
For most of the 20th century, demands to incorporate labour rights and standards like freedom to 
organize and child labour laws into international trade and investment agreements made policy 
experts grimace. "That's politics," said government officials, international economists, and 
multinational executives and investors with dismissive waves. "We don't do that, we do trade," 
they explained as they laid down free trade rules to roll global commerce forward. through 
Bretton Woods institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, global 
trade groups like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor World 
Trade Organization (WTO), and economic coordinating bodies like the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
Trade expansion brought an international rule of law for such matters as intellectual property 
rights, investment guarantees, government procurement, free transit across borders for 
multinational lawyers, bankers, and executives, and other corporate interests. Meanwhile, 
workers’ calls for social justice in new trade regimes were mostly ignored. 
Global commerce and trade agreements had profound, accumulating effects on working people 
around the world in the last decades of the 20th century. International trade is inherently social 
and political. Workers have to struggle for justice, power, and protection against labour rights 
violations in the new global economy. Their struggles are still rooted locally in the places where 
they work, in the communities where they live, and under the laws of their local, state, and 
national governments. But the link to the global economy and the growing importance of 
international rules cannot be denied. 
The Labour Rights-Trade Link in NAFTA and the NAALC 
Negotiated in 1993 by Canada, Mexico, and the United States, the North American Free Trade 
Agreement’s supplemental labour pact, the North American Agreement on Labour Cooperation 
(NAALC), sets forth eleven "Labour Principles" that the three signatory countries commit 
themselves to promote: 
1) freedom of association and protection of the right to organize 
2) the right to bargain collectively 
3) the right to strike 
4) forced labour 
5) child labour 
6) minimum wage, hours of work and other labour standards 
7) non-discrimination 
8) equal pay for equal work 
9) occupational safety and health 
10) workers' compensation 
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11) migrant worker protection. 
The NAALC signers pledged to effectively enforce their national labour laws in these eleven 
subject areas, and agreed to open themselves to critical reviews of their performance by the other 
countries. It is worth noting that these subjects range far beyond the “core labour standards” 
recently elaborated by the International Labour Organization (ILO). The ILO’s definition is 
limited to organizing and bargaining rights, forced labour, child labour, and discrimination (ILO 
1998). At the same time, however, the NAALC failed to address critical issues of development 
assistance or worker migration, for example, and did not develop a strategy for upward 
harmonization of labour standards, emphasizing instead effective enforcement of national law. 
Complaint Mechanism 
Trade unionists and their allies can file complaints on one or more of these labour principles in a 
new institutional structure that provides for investigations, public hearings, written reports, 
government-to-government consultations, independent evaluations, non-binding 
recommendations and other “soft law” measures common to most international agreements. At 
each stage, advocates can intervene to press for favorable outcomes. 
A “hard law” edge can be applied for three labour principles: those covering minimum wage, 
child labour, and occupational safety and health. An independent arbitral panel is empowered to 
fine an offending government for a “persistent pattern of failure to effectively enforce” domestic 
labour law. If the fine is not paid, the panel can apply trade sanctions on the firm, industry, or 
sector where workers’ rights violations occurred. 
II. EXPERIENCE UNDER THE NAALC 
For labour rights advocates with patience and willingness to put it to the test, the NAALC has 
emerged as a viable new arena for creative transnational action. With its unusual “cross-border” 
complaint mechanism, the Agreement provides an opportunity for workers, trade unions and 
their allies in the United States, Mexico and Canada to work together concretely to defend 
workers’ rights against abuses by corporations and governments. 
The NAALC is not a full-fledged international enforcement mechanism. It is not.intended to 
resolve specific complaints and to issue orders to reinstate workers unjustly discharged, orders to 
recognize and bargain with trade unions, orders to remove children from unlawful labour, orders 
to adjust pay for women to equal that of men, orders to install air filters to reduce health hazards, 
orders to provide compensation to injured workers, and other remedies associated with labour 
law enforcement. These matters are left to national legislation and national enforcement 
mechanisms. 
The NAALC is intended as a review mechanism by which member countries open themselves up 
to investigation, reports, evaluations, recommendations and other measures so that over time 
such enhanced oversight and scrutiny will generate more effective labour law enforcement. To 
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the extent legislative responses can be fashioned within national systems, rather than imposed by 
a supranational power, oversight under the NAALC can also change the climate for labour law 
reform in each country to achieve greater adherence to NAALC principles and obligations. 
Advocates need to be practical about how far governments are prepared to go to hand over 
traditional sovereignty on labour issues to new international tribunals. Even the European Union, 
with extensive labour rights provisions that can be enforced by the European Court of Justice, 
leaves issues of salaries, union organizing and collective bargaining, and the right to strike 
untouched by EU directives. Single member countries hold veto power over EU policy on social 
security and social protection, redundancies and other key matters. 
In the six years since it took effect, NAFTA’s labour side agreement has given rise to a varied, 
rich experience of international labour rights advocacy. As of January 1, 2001 nearly 25 
complaints had been filed under the NAALC. Some observers have called this number 
distressingly low considering the volume of workers= rights violations in North America. But 
the NAALC aims to get at systemic problems, not specific worker grievances. Cases so far 
embrace workers’ organizing and bargaining efforts, occupational safety and health, migrant 
worker protection, minimum employment standards, discrimination against women, 
compensation for workplace injuries, and other critically important issues. Until now they were 
hidden in the bureaucratic interstices of each country’s national labour law system, with no 
international scrutiny or accountability. The NAALC is beginning to change that. 
A rapid summary of just a few cases – and later a more detailed look at one – suggests how 
advocates get results. Gains are not made through direct enforcement by an international 
tribunal. They come obliquely, through indirect action, by exploiting the spaces created by this 
new labour rights instrument to strengthen cross-border ties among labour rights advocates and 
to generate unexpected pressures on governments and on transnational enterprises. To be 
effective, labour rights advocates using the Agreement must seek help from their counterparts 
across the border. 
• In 1996 the provincial government of Alberta, Canada announced plans to privatize 
workplace health and safety enforcement. Labour inspectors would be sacked and 
become independent contractors. The public employees’ union declared it would file a 
NAALC complaint charging Alberta with not just failure, but with a complete abdication, 
of its responsibility to effectively enforce health and safety laws. The government 
dropped the plan (Chambers 1996a 1996b). 
• In 1996 Mexican labour authorities dissolved a small, democratic trade union in the 
Fisheries ministry when that agency was merged into the larger environmental ministry, 
where a bigger pro-government held bargaining rights. Together with US human rights 
groups, the dissident union filed a NAALC complaint in the United States charging 
failure to enforce Mexican constitutional guarantees of freedom of association. At a 
public hearing in Washington, D.C., Mexican government officials and leaders of both 
Mexican unions, labour law experts from both countries, and US labour and human rights 
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advocates testified, generating wide publicity in both countries and a US NAO report that 
detailed abuses in a government-mandated trade union monopoly. The smaller, dissident 
union regained its registration and has continued its activity in the democratic union 
movement (UNAM 1999). 
• Mexican and US telephone workers unions filed a 1997 complaint with the US NAO 
when workers at the Maxi-Switch electronics factory in Sonora, Mexico tried to form an 
independent union but were denied registration. Two days before a scheduled public 
hearing in Tuscon, Arizona (near the Sonora plant) the Mexican government and the 
Mexican telephone workers union agreed to settle the complaint and cancel the hearing. 
Registration was granted to the independent union (Resource Center of the Americas 
1997). 
• A 1997 complaint by a coalition of US and Mexican labour and human rights groups 
challenged the widespread practice of pregnancy testing in the maquiladora factories. A 
public hearing in Texas near the border area exposed the involvement of well-known US 
companies like General Motors and Zenith and led to a US NAO report confirming the 
abuses. Several US multinational firms announced they would halt the practice, and 
advocacy groups in Mexico launched new efforts for reform legislation to halt pregnancy 
testing in employment (Dillon 1998). 
• US and Mexican labour, human rights, and local community advocacy groups filed a 
NAALC complaint with the US NAO in1997 against interference with an independent 
union organizing effort and health and safety violations at a Hyundai Motors supplier 
called Han Young. A 1998 public hearing in San Diego, California and followup 
governmental consultations and public forums made the case an international incident. 
The Mexican labour department applied the first substantial fines against any company 
for health and safety violations. The independent union gained bargaining rights and has 
maintained an active, high-profile campaign with international support for securing a 
collective agreement (Dibble 1999). 
• More than twenty trade union and allied organizations filed NAALC complaints in 1997 
with the US NAO and in 1998 with the Canadian NAO on violations of workers’ 
organizing rights and health and safety laws at a US company-owned auto parts factory 
in Mexico City called ITAPSA. The coalition mounted broad-based activity in 
connection with public hearings in both countries, as well as protests at corporate 
shareholder meetings. International support has allowed the union to maintain its struggle 
for recognition (McBrearty 1998). 
• A 1999 complaint to the US NAO by flight attendants’ unions in the United States and 
Mexico charged Mexico with failing to enforce freedom of association by denying flight 
attendants represented by a “wall-to-wall” pro-government union at the TAESA airline 
the right to form an independent union. A March 2000 public hearing in Washington, 
D.C. buttressed workers’ claims and demonstrated international support for Mexican 
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flight attendants, who undertook protest actions in major airports. Later in 2000, in a 
parallel situation at another airline, the Mexican government reversed its stance and 
allowed flight attendants to vote separately on union representation to avoid a new round 
of international scrutiny1 
• Canadian and US unions filed a NAALC complaint with the US NAO in 1998 after 
McDonald’s closed a Montreal restaurant where workers had formed a union. The 
complaint targeted flaws in Quebec’s labour law that allowed companies to close work 
sites for anti-union motivation. When the US NAO accepted the complaint and scheduled 
public hearings, Quebec trade unions, employer federations, and labour department 
officials agreed to take up the matter in a labour code reform bill rather than have 
Quebec’s “dirty laundry” aired in a US public hearing. The unions withdrew the 
complaint, and the hearing was cancelled (Associated Press 1998; Ginsbach 1999). 
• Twenty-five unions, health and safety advocacy groups, human rights organizations and 
allied community support network filed a major new complaint with the US NAO in 
2000 for workers suffering egregious health and safety violations at two Auto-Trim 
manufacturing plants in the maquiladora region. The 100-page complaint reflects long 
and careful collaboration among the filing organizations, a high level of technical 
competency and legal argument, and a powerful indictment of the government’s failure to 
enforce health and safety laws. A public hearing was set for early 2001 (NAFTA 2000). 
In each of these cases new alliances were built among groups that had hardly ever communicated 
until the NAALC complaint gave them a concrete venue for working together. For leaders and 
activists of independent Mexican trade unions in particular, access to international allies and to a 
mechanism for scrutiny of repressive tactics long hidden from international public view provided 
strength and protection to build their movement. 
This accounting is not meant to overstate the Agreement’s impact. Each of the cases noted here 
is more complicated than these capsule summaries can convey, and the advantages gained are 
uneven. Using the NAALC does not mean going from triumph to triumph. But the nature of 
trade union work in during the current neoliberal offensive, both in the national context and in 
the context of globalization, is anything but a triumphant march forward. It is more of a hard slog 
through rocks and mud, usually with more backsliding and sideslipping than progress. 
Asking workers to turn to the NAALC to air their grievances must be joined by honest cautions 
that it cannot directly result in regained jobs, union recognition, or back pay for violations. 
Unions and allied groups have to weigh the value of using the Agreement in light of staff time, 
of energy and resources that might be allocated elsewhere, when a specific payoff in new 
members or new collective agreements cannot be promised. Gains come obliquely, over time, by 
pressing companies and governments to change their behavior, by sensitizing public opinion, by 
building ties of solidarity, and taking other steps to change the climate for workers’ rights 
advances in North America. Perhaps over time even direct gains can be achieved as the NAALC 
system elaborates a kind of labour law jurisprudence for North America that informs decisions 
6 
by national bodies. But that goal is still to be met. 
The Problem of Sovereignty 
It could hardly be otherwise at this stage of regional integration among such diverse countries. 
Take one of the early NAALC cases, for example, involving Sprint Corp., the US 
telecommunications giant. In 1994, Sprint closed a San Francisco facility shortly before more 
than 200 workers there were to vote for union representation. In national legal proceedings, the 
highest US federal court authorities ruled in the company’s favor, saying the evidence showed 
the closing was a lawful one motivated by business considerations, not antiunionism. 
On a separate track, a NAALC complaint led to widely noted public hearings in San Francisco 
that gave an international platform to affected workers and union leaders from the United States, 
Mexico and Europe who exposed Sprint’s antiunion actions and challenged the company’s joint 
ventures in Mexico and other countries. The NAALC’s permanent secretariat published a 250-
page study comparing each country’s legal regime for antiunion plant closures that highlighted 
widespread abuses in the US system. 
Trade unionists involved in the Sprint case denounced the NAALC as worthless because it did 
not overturn the federal court’s decision and order the company to reopen the plant, rehire the 
workers with back pay, and recognize the union. Tactically, such denunciations are fair enough 
as a way to attack Sprint. But to expect the agreement to create an international labour tribunal 
empowered to independently take evidence and overrule national courts is completely 
unrealistic. 
The Agreement was negotiated by countries with highly developed and highly divergent labour 
law and labour relations systems. Each is a product of unique time, space, and language-bound 
social histories. The result was inevitably a compromised hybrid. The states opened themselves 
to a cross-border oversight mechanism, with limited enforcement powers, while guarding 
sovereignty over key elements of their national systems. It is not the agreement trade unionists 
and workers’ rights advocates would have written were it left to them, but it was not left to them. 
The challenge is to exploit what was written, and to change it over time to strengthen workers’ 
rights. In some cases unwittingly, NAALC negotiators created new space for advocates to 
communicate, collaborate, strategize and act together, seizing opportunities that had never 
existed. 
A TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY PERSPECTIVE 
NAALC “Platforms” 
Metaphorically, the NAALC can be seen creating a series of sliding platforms crossing the space 
of one, two or three countries. From these platforms, trade unionists and their allies can direct 
fire at their own and the others’ governments, their own and the others’ national and 
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multinational corporations, even their own and the others’ corrupted trade unions. 
The platforms can cross borders in equal proportion, or be anchored mostly in one country. They 
rest first on the Agreement’s unique, accessible cross-border complaint mechanism. Workers 
who suffer abuses, and their defenders, have to file a complaint with the government of another 
country, not the country where violations occurred. Under the agreement, “any person” can file 
such complaints. There are no citizenship requirements or requirements that a complainant be an 
injured party or have a material stake in a case. 
The result is that social actors that use the NAALC seek partners in the country or country where 
they intend to file complaints. Indeed, most of the more than twenty cases filed so far have 
involved transnational coalitions of unions and allied human rights and community groups who 
find in the Agreement’s institutional mechanisms new opportunities to develop relationships and 
joint action. 
Before the NAALC was created, cross-border trade union relationships mostly consisted of thin 
contacts at two levels. One was between high-level union leaders who attended conferences and 
conventions and agreed on resolutions of support without much followup. The other consisted of 
sporadic local union-to-local union contacts and occasional worker-to-worker delegations that 
usually were aimed at helping the poor Mexicans. These links paled in comparison with the 
business-to-business contacts and boss-to-boss delegations that occur every day in North 
American commerce. 
The new NAALC platforms allow transnational social actors to demand investigations, public 
hearings and government consultations on workers’ rights violations. Advocates now have the 
opportunity to strategize and plan together in a sustained fashion, gathering evidence for drafting 
a complaint, crafting its elements, setting priorities, defining demands, launching media 
campaigns, meeting with government officials to set the agenda for a hearing and to press them 
for thorough reviews and followup, preparing to testify in public hearings, engaging technical 
experts to buttress a case with scientific elements (a health and safety case, for example), 
influencing the composition of independent experts’ panels and the terms of reference of their 
investigation, and other concrete tasks that go far beyond adopting resolutions or arranging serial 
worker-to-worker meetings. 
Why Bother? 
The criticism can be fairly made that this is staff work, not rank-and-file mobilization. It 
occupies lawyers, researchers, publicists and other union and NGO professionals without 
engaging workers. Worse, it can create false illusions of relief through bureaucratic legal 
mechanisms instead of workers’ own power. It looks for help from the same governments that 
are chiefly interested in protecting capital, not labour. For labour radicals, why bother? 
Bother for the same reasons workers have to bother with national legal systems: because those 
are the mechanisms workers have gained after long political organizing and bargaining struggles 
8 
in a system that is stacked against them. 
Legal work, media advocacy, lobbying and other “inside game” moves are deeply compromised, 
flawed and frustrating. They are poor, pale, anemic substitutes for rich, red, robust worker 
mobilization and struggle against corporate power. But the balance of power in a capitalist 
society – or rather the imbalance of power, accentuated now by globalization of production and 
investment flows – constricts the space for worker action and makes all the more precious the 
spaces that become available. 
Of course workers must take up struggle through organizing, strikes, demonstrations, protests 
and other forms of direct action. But they cannot do it all the time, every day, in every dispute. 
There are inherent limits to time, space, energy, resources and other factors affecting capacity for 
workers’ struggle. More fundamentally, the balance of power is unfavorable. Workers are not 
now in a position to vanquish the capitalist class or the capitalist state. Their agenda is 
necessarily a “Plan B” involving selective struggle, incremental gains through politics and 
legislation, and creative exploitation of national legal institutions as well as new international 
mechanisms like the NAALC to advance their interests. 
Transnational advocacy networks have to work around the lack of “hard law” features which 
create accountability through trials of evidence, findings of guilt, and enforcement by state 
power – putting lawbreakers in jail, or seizing their assets to satisfy a financial judgment. 
Instead, they must exploit the potential for “soft law” mechanisms typical of the NAALC and 
other international instruments and mechanisms. Soft law is marked by investigations, reviews, 
research, reports, information exchanges, public hearings (as distinct from trials of evidence), 
consultations, evaluations, recommendations, declarations, publicity, exposés; the “mobilization 
of shame,” as it is sometimes put, to enforce judgments in the court of public opinion. 
These measures should not be scorned or boycotted by social actors, and least by transnational 
actors looking for openings, spaces, platforms or other bases for creative intervention and 
exploitation. The challenge is to integrate involvement in institutional settings with action in 
extra-institutional settings. 
This is not meant as a wide-eyed endorsement of using the NAALC at every opportunity. 
Choices about resource allocation and measurement of potential gains have to be made. Actors 
face unavoidable compromises using instruments and procedures created by governments more 
attuned to corporate concerns than to workers’ interests. It is just a short step to cooptation if 
advocates become so enamored of international labour rights instruments like the NAALC that 
they devalue struggle against the neoliberal agenda, like that in the streets of Seattle. 
Given the structurally defensive position of workers in a corporate-dominated system, sole 
reliance on denunciation, confrontation and rejection, while scorning involvement in efforts to 
link workers’ rights to trade or to use the inevitably flawed agreements that follow, is a self-
limiting strategy. Putting all the energy of the international movement against corporate power 
into protesting WTO and international bankers’ conclaves, or launching ad hoc media campaigns 
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against Wal-Mart’s latest sale of products made by child labour, is only one side of a strategic 
whole. Both sides are needed, and both sides need each other. One is a sharp “no” to the 
corporate agenda and related mobilization that denounces, exposes, protests and even shuts down 
– if only for a few hours – the gears of global trade and investment. The other is a savvy, 
strategic exploitation of pressure points found in international human rights and labour rights 
instruments, however flawed they may be compared with what labour rights advocates would 
create on their own without governments or transnational enterprises to contend with. 
Contrary to the scornful dismissal of the NAALC by skeptics and critics on the left, fear and 
loathing mark the views of government and corporate officials at the opposite pole. Former 
Mexican government officials who made light of the Agreement when it was negotiated in 1993 
later condemned it for the scrutiny and condemnation it brought to Mexican labour practices 
under the spotlight of complaints, public hearings, public reports, government-to-government 
consultations. One denounced “indiscriminate acceptance” of complaints and warned that the 
NAALC served “the tactical interests of US unions and so-called ‘independent trade unions’ in 
Mexico” (Medina 1999). 
US corporate executives and attorneys think the Agreement has been hijacked by trade union 
radicals to attack company conduct throughout North America, and demand an end to 
contentious complaint procedures where unions and their allies brand companies as workers’ 
rights violators. An executive of the Washington state apple industry said “unions on both sides 
of the border are abusing the NAFTA process in an effort to expand their power . . . NAFTA’s 
labour side agreement is an open invitation for specific labour disputes to be raised into an 
international question . . . and could open the door to a host of costly and frivolous complaints 
against US employers.” (Iritani 1998). 
THE WASHINGTON APPLE CASE 
The Washington state apple case is a rich example “platform-building” by strategic use of the 
NAALC and how it can foster new ties of solidarity and sustained work among labour rights 
advocates in the United States and Mexico. More than 50,000 Mexican workers labour in the 
orchards and processing plants of the largest apple-growing region in the United States. 
Employers crushed their efforts throughout the 1990s to form trade unions, to bargain 
collectively, to have job health and safety protection, to end discrimination, and to make other 
workplace gains. 
In 1997 the Teamsters union and the United Farm Workers agreed to develop a NAALC case on 
these issues. They reached out for support to Mexican unions, farmworker advocacy groups, and 
human rights organizations. A complaint was drafted, translated and redrafted to the satisfaction 
of the newly-formed network. In May 1998 the question was then posed: who should sign the 
complaint, which would be filed with the Mexican labour department? Put another way, who 
would be publicly identified as the parties that triggered international scrutiny of labour abuses 
in Washington State that might result in sanctions against apple exports to Mexico? Mexico is 
the largest single export market for Washington apples, and since the complaint addressed health 
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and safety violations among many others, it was susceptible to sanctions. 
The two US unions were each trying to organize apple workers, one in the orchards and one in 
the processing plants. They wanted to avoid employers’ countercharges that they were out to 
destroy apple workers’ jobs. On the Mexican side, the independent union allies in the Unión 
Nacional de Trabajadores (UNT), the Frente Auténtico del Trabajo (FAT), the Frente 
Democrático de Campesinos (FDC) and other groups working with their US counterparts were 
sensitive to government and official union accusations that they were “puppets” of protectionist 
US unions. At the same time, from an inside-Mexico competitive standpoint, they wanted to be 
seen as frontline defenders of migrant workers in the United States, ahead of the official unions 
and ahead of the PRI government. 
After careful consultations through personal visits, telephone conference calls, e-mail exchanges 
and other communications among key leaders and staffers of all these organizations, the 
complaint was officially signed by just the Mexican organizations, not by any US groups. An 
American NGO, the International Labour Rights Fund, became the public face of a media 
campaign in the United States, issuing press releases and sending an investigator to the apple 
growing region to meet with workers about the cases and to interview potential witnesses for a 
hearing to be held in Mexico, with behind-the-scenes help from the unions. An experienced 
organizer from the FAT came to Washington to help the unions in their organizing efforts. The 
AFL-CIO’s Solidarity Center pledged financial support to send Washington apple workers to 
Mexico for the hearings. Less than one month after the Washington State apple complaint was 
filed in Mexico, the CTM – the official, pro-government union federation in Mexico – filed its 
own first-ever NAALC complaint over treatment of migrant Mexican workers at an opposite 
corner of the United States, in the Easternmost state of Maine. 
In December 1998 a hearing in the case was held in Mexico City. Advocates faced another 
strategic decision. Should worker witnesses be Mexican migrants alone, which would obviate the 
need for translation and allow more workers to testify? Or should non-Mexican, English-
speaking workers also participate (many Anglo workers are employed in the processing plants, 
not in the orchards, which are entirely Mexican migrants) at the cost of a bumpier hearing 
process? US advocates first suggested an all-Mexican, Spanish-only project. But Mexicans 
thought the effort would be strengthened by presenting united interests of both Mexican and 
American workers. Long-time Anglo workers joined the delegation and the unions provided 
interpretation for them during press conferences, during meetings with Mexican workers and 
trade unionists, and at the hearing at the Mexican labour department. Their shoulder-to-shoulder 
stance with Mexican coworkers lent a powerful image of solidarity to the public face of the 
campaign. 
The hearing in Mexico City itself was a dramatic example of the reach of the NAALC 
“platform” and the leaping of spatial, language and cultural boundaries in the North American 
context. Half a dozen officials from an agency of the Mexican government heard, in their own 
language, accounts of labour rights abuses by a delegation of Mexican workers employed in the 
United States thousands of miles to the North in an industry for which Mexico is a major 
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consumer market. The hearing was prompted by a complaint initiated by US trade unionists in 
Washington State, Washington D.C. and California (site of the United Farm Workers union 
headquarters; the Teamsters union headquarters are in Washington, D.C.), then filed by allies in 
Mexican labour and human rights organizations in Mexico City after lengthy cross-border 
planning. 
At the hearing, the Mexican workers were joined by Spanish-speaking US trade union 
representatives and human rights attorneys, by Mexican independent union and farmworker 
advocates, and by English-speaking co-workers who deliver their own duly interpreted testimony 
in English. 
The Mexican labour department later issued a report demanding consultations between the 
labour secretaries of the two countries. They agreed on a program, due to be implemented in 
early 2001, of public outreach and public hearings chaired by US and Mexican officials from the 
two federal governments and from the state government. The forums would take place in the 
apple-growing region of Washington, where large numbers of workers are prepared to testify 
about conditions in both Spanish and English. 
In succession, labour advocates used the NAALC to build multiple, accumulating pressure on 
corporations, governments and unions. The NAALC provided concrete means of pressing the 
apple growing industry to improve conditions or risk losing the Mexican market; pressing the 
government of Mexico to conduct a thorough review of the complaint, to hold public hearings 
for workers from the United States, and to issue a strong report seeking ministerial consultations. 
Using the NAALC led to the officialista Mexican labour unions taking their own action on 
behalf of Mexican migrants in the United States by filing the NAALC complaint on events in 
Maine. It also served to pressure the US government to agree to public events in Washington 
State and to devote its own energies to seeking improved conditions, and to pressure the state 
government to take steps in matters of state competence to improve conditions, especially with 
regard to worker housing and safety and health. While cycling from national to transnational 
arenas, every step was accompanied by a media campaign that kept the dispute in the public eye 
and shaped a new, rights-based discourse linked to North American economic integration. 
CONCLUSION 
The apple case shows how expanding coalitions of trade union, human rights, migrant worker, 
women’s rights and other progressive communities involved in using the NAALC are adding 
new chapters to stories already known of transnational advocacy networks using new 
international instruments and institutions to promote their goals (Helfer and Slaughter 1997; 
Keck and Sikkink 1998; Koh 1991; Smith, Chatfield and Pagnucco 1997; Mitchell 1998)2. 
Admittedly, the new networks until now have mostly engaged trade union and NGO leaders, 
organizers, lawyers, researchers, publicists and other cadres, not masses of workers in a genuine 
transnational social movement. But constructing and strengthening ties among these cadres is a 
precondition to a new global solidarity unionism that is the longer-term goal (Waterman 2000) 
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The new instruments and institutions of international labour rights advocacy reflected in the 
NAALC are flawed. But they create spaces, terrains, platforms and other metaphorical 
foundations where advocates can unite across frontiers and plant their feet to promote new 
norms, mobilize actors, call to account governments and corporations, disseminate research 
findings, launch media campaigns, educate each other and the public, challenge traditional 
notions of sovereignty, give legitimacy to their cause by invoking human rights and labour rights 
principles – in sum, to redefine debates and discourse by breaking up old frameworks and 
shaping new ones3. 
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 The author has personal knowledge of this development as he serves as legal counsel to the Mexican and US flight 
attendants unions in the case. 
2
 I am indebted to Jonathan Graubart, a PhD candidate at the University of Wisconsin for pointing to these sources 
in his forthcoming doctoral dissertation. The distinction between a transnational social movement and a transnational 
advocacy network is elaborated by Sidney Tarrow (Tarrow 1999). 
3
 One useful description is that of "transnational norm entrepreneurs" (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). 
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